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I. Introduction
In efficiency wage models, workers' productivity depends positively on the wage, giving firms
an incentive to pay wages above their market-clearing level. Two models in this literature are
the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz [12] and Bowles [1] and the turnover cost model of
Stiglitz [13], Schlicht [11], and Salop [10]. In the shirking model, a higher wage and a higher
unemployment rate raise the cost of losing one's job, thereby discouraging workers from shirking
and increasing their effort. In the turnover cost model, a higher wage reduces quits and thus lowers
the firm's cost of hiring and training new workers. Given the role of separations in efficiency wage
models, it is important to understand the determinants of separations. This study uses data on
individual workers to examine the determinants of dismissals, quits, and layoffs within the first
six months of a hire, paying particular attention to dismissals because of the prominence of the
shirking model in the efficiency wage literaturi The purposes of this study are JO t~st ,~h~ther_
nigher unemployment lowers dismissals, as predicted by the shirking model, and to examine the
effect of firm variables related to the costs of monitoring and shirking on the probability of a
~ismissal. In addition, this study provides insight into the effects of firm character~sticsand worker
characteristics on dismissals, quits, and layoffs. 1
*1 would like to thank Michael Haines, Tom Michl, Mark Montgomery, Bob Turner, and an anonymous referee
for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Mark Montgomery and Mike Podgursky
for providing the EOPP data to me.
I. Several previous studies have attempted to test the shirking model. Rebitzer [8] and Green and Weisskopf [7]
analyzed the effect of unemployment on productivity with data from different industries, and Weisskopf, Bowles, and
Gordon [16] and Weisskopf [15] analyzed the effect of unemployment on productivity with aggregate data. All four studies
found that higher unemployment raises productivity in the U.S. Cappelli and Chauvin [5] examined the dismissal rate
of plants operated by the same firm, but in different locations. They found that the difference between the plant's wage
and the average wage for production workers in the plant's SMSA has a negative and significant effect on the plant's
dismissal rate, but they did not find a significant effect of the unemployment rate. Campbell [4], using a nonparametric
hazard model to analyze dismissals with individual data from the EOPP survey (described in section II), found that
the probability of dismissal depends negatively on the unemployment rate. This study also found that dismissals depend
negatively on the firm's size and the worker's education, and depend positively on the capital-labor ratio and on a dummy
variable for males.
The present study expands on previous work by investigating the determinants of dismissals, quits, and layoffs in
the context of a single regression model, with data on individual firms and workers. It can thus examine the effect of
firm and worker characteristics, as well as labor market conditions, on the probability of different types of separations. In
addition, it considers the behavior of firms operating in many different industries, and includes a richer set of geographical
control variables than have previous studies.
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II. Results
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The equations for dismissals, quits, and layoffs2 were estimated with data from the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey of employers, which was conducted in the spring of
1980. 5302 firms in 28 geographic locations (in 11 states 3) and 63 2-digit SIC industries were
interviewed. The survey included questions concerning the personal characteristics of the last
worker hired by the firm between 1 January 1978 and 1 October 1979. Firms were also asked
whether this worker was still employed at the firm, and if not, whether the separation was a quit,
a layoff, a discharge, or an induced resignation. A worker was considered to be dismissed if he or
she were discharged or induced to resign. Table I lists the variables' names, descriptions, means,
and standard deviations.
In the shirking modeV workers' effort depends on the probability of finding another job
if dismissed, which, in turn, depends on the unemployment rate. Two unemployment rates are
considered: the unemployment rate in the local labor market and the unemployment rate in the
2-digit SIC industry.s Dismissals should also depend negatively on the cost of monitoring since
firms with high monitoring costs would be expected to monitor their workers less intensely. This
cost cannot be measured directly, so it was proxied by the firm's size since Bulow and Summers [2]
and Rebitzer and Robinson [9] suggest that monitoring costs are likely to be higher at large firms.
In addition, dismissals should depend positively on the capital-labor ratio since firms with high
capital-labor ratios will suffer the greatest losses if their workers shirk and waste the services of
the capital with which they work or damage it through their carelessness. 6
These variables may also affect the probability of a quit or a layoff. High unemployment is
likely to reduce quits, since fewer workers should quit if jobs are scarce. On the other hand, high
unemployment may raise layoffs, since firms are most likely to layoff workers during recessions.
Firm size is likely to raise the cost of hiring and training workers, since part of the cost of being
trained involves learning the way the organization operates and forming working relationships
with co-workers across the organization. Thus, larger firms have a greater incentive to retain
workers during economic downturns and to take actions to discourage workers from quitting.
~---.~-.

,~~

2. Dismissals and layoffs are considered as distinct processes since dismissals generally result from a worker's
poor performance, while layoffs generally result from a decline in demand for the firm's output. Note that a rise in the
unemployment rate would be expected to reduce dismissals since higher unemployment should induce workers to work
harder, but it would be expected to increase layoffs since the unemployment rate and product demand tend to be negatively
correlated.
3. These states were Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
4. See Campbell [3] for a model in which workers choose the utility-maximizing level of effort to provide and firms
choose the profit-maximizing wage and monitoring intensity. Dismissals then depend on the firm's monitoring intensity
and on its workers' effort. Both of these are endogenous, but are functions of three exogenous variables: the probability
of a dismissed worker finding another job, the firm's cost of monitoring workers, and the firm's capital-labor ratio.
5. The local unemployment rate is a weighted average of the county unemployment rates in the counties comprising
the local labor market, with the weights determined by the employment in each county. These data were obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publication, Unemployment in State and Local Areas. The industry unemployment
rates are based on unpublished figures obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Both the industry unemployment
rate and the local unemployment rate are weighted averages of annual unemployment rates, with the weights determined
by the proportion of the first six months of a worker's observed employment spell occurring in each year.
6. Since shirkers are more likely to misuse or damage equipment than structures, the measure of capital used
in this study includes only capital equipment. This variable is not available at the firm level, so data from the 2-digit
SIC industry in 1979 were used. Figures on the capital stock were obtained from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth
in the United States, 1925-1985, published by the Economic Analysis Bureau of the Commerce Department. Figures on
employment were obtained from the BLS publication, Employment and Earnings.
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Table I. Variable Names, Descriptions, Means, and Standard Deviations
Variable

Description

DISMISS
QUIT
LAYOFF
LOCUR
INDUR
FlRMSIZE
K/L

= I if worker dismissed
= 1 if worker quit
= 1 if worker laid off

%UN/oN
WRR
WA
ENCFDFM

RURAL
AGE
SEX
EDUC
EXPER
%BLACK

Local unemployment rate
Industry unemployment rate
Log of firm's employment
Industry ratio of capital equipment to labor
(in $millions of capital per worker)
Proportion of firm's workforce unionized
Wage Replacement Ratio (ratio of state's
UI benefits to state's average earnings)
Dummy variable for Washington state
Dummy variable for states where
employer is not charged for discharges for
misconduct
Dummy variable for rural areas
Age in years
= 1 if male
Years of education
Months of useful job experience
Proportion black in local labor market

/-L

(T

0.037
0.128
0.034
6.47
6.43
2.96
0.Q114

0.189
0.334
0.181
1.55
2.53
1.56
0.0160

0.107
0.240

0.283
0.0351

0.123
0.760

0.328
0.427

0.502
26.60
0.501
12.05
41.2
0.135

0.500
9.49
0.500
1.66
63.54
0.130

Firms with a high capital-labor ratio also have an incentive to retain workers, since inexperienced
workers would be the most likely to damage or misuse the capital with which they work. Thus,
we would expect quits and layoffs to depend negatively on the capital-labor ratio.
The firm's unionization rate is included in the regressions, since regulations in unionized
firms may make dismissing workers more difficult and since unions can generally negotiate a high
wage for their workers, making these workers less likely to shirk or to quit. In addition, according
to Freeman [6], unions provide a voice for workers' grievances, reducing the probability that they
will quit if dissatisfied with their jobs. Furthermore, unions tend to make wages more rigid, so
that highly unionized firms may be more likely to layoff workers in response to a reduction in
demand.
Several regional variables are included in the regressions. The first is the ratio of state Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits to wages in that state. 7 In addition, a dummy variable was
created for Washington since a firm's UI tax in that state depends on the change in its payroll
from year-to-year and not on the number of workers it discharges or lays off. Because a firm's UI
tax in that state is less related to its dismissal and layoff behavior than in other states, we would
expect more dismissals and layoffs to occur in Washington. A dummy variable was also created
for states in which a firm's UI tax is not raised if it dismisses a worker for misconduct, as firms

7. This variable was obtained by dividing the average of the state's maximum and minimum monthly VI benefits by
average monthly earnings in that state. Data on VI benefits were obtained from the Dept. of Labor publication, Comparison
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws [14]. Average monthly earnings were obtained by multiplying average hourly
earnings in manufacturing by 174. Figures from manufacturing were used since aggregate average hourly earnings are
not available at the state level. Data on earnings were obtained from the BLS publication, Employment and Earnings.
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in these states would be more likely to dismiss workers. Finally, a dummy variable was created
for rural areas since labor markets are generally thinner in these areas, making it more difficult
for workers to find a new job at a given level of the unemployment rate. We would thus expect
fewer dismissals and quits in rural areas than in urban and suburban areas.
A worker's age, sex, experience, and education are included because these variables may
affect workers' performance, the disutility they derive from effort, and their ability to evade detection. These variables may also affect their propensity to quit or a firm's decisions to lay them off. In
addition, dummy variables for occupational groups and I-digit SIC industries are included because
the costs of monitoring, shirking, and turnover may differ across occupations and industries. s
In addition, the degree of monitoring, a firm's dismissal and layoff decisions, and a worker's
alternative employment opportunities may depend on the race of the worker. While data are not
available on the race of the workers in the sample, a variable for the proportion of blacks in the
local labor market was included in the regressions. 9
The wage is not included in the regressions. While much work in the shirking and quit
literatures has concentrated on the role of the wage in deterring shirking and quitting, the wage
is an endogenous variable that is set at its optimal level by the firm.
The separation equations were estimated with a multinomial log it model, where the dependent variable was a dichotomous variable indicating whether the worker had been dismissed,
had quit, or had been laid off within six months of starting work.lO The reason why separations
within the first six months were considered is that the survey asked about the most recently hired
worker prior to 1 October 1979, and the interviews started in March 1980, with most (84%) being
conducted after I April 1980. Thus, almost every worker in the sample can be observed for a
minimum of six months. While some workers can be observed for more than six months, restricting the observation length to six months means that the separation behavior of all workers
is observed for the same length of time.
A po.~~ible source of bias in the EOPP data is that not all the firms in the sample hired
workers after 1 January 1978, so the firms hiring workers may not represent a random sample
of all firms that were surveyed. To test whether this is a serious problem, a dummy variable
indicating whether each firm in the sample had reported a hire after 1 January 1978 was regressed
on the variables from Table I that are most related to a firm's hiring decision. ll It was found
that the probability of a hire is affected positively and significantly by firm size and is affected
negatively and significantly by the local unemployment rate and the unionization rate. Because
of the possibility of sample selection bias, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) was calculated from
the hiring equations, and its value was included in one of the separation equations. Some caution
must be used, however, in interpreting the regression including the Inverse Mills Ratio since there
8. The coefficients on these dummy variables are not reported in the tables to save space, but the complete tables
are available from the author upon request.
9. A variable for the Hispanic proportion of the population in the local labor market was always insignificant, so
this variable was not included in the reported regressions.
10. While some studies have used hazard models to examine separations, I know of no hazard model that allows
for three different types of risks.
11. The results of this regression are available from the author upon request. In addition, it should be noted that
some firms reported hires before 1/1/78 or after 10/1/79, in spite of the fact that the survey asked only about hires
between these dates. In the hiring equations, firms that hired before 1/1/78 were treated as not having a hire within the
sample period, but firms that hired after 10/1/79 were treated as having a hire, since it is likely that many of these firms
also hired between 1/1/78 and 10/1/79. In the separation equations, firms were omitted from the sample if there was less
than six months from the date of the hire to the date of the firm's interview.
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is some debate among economists on whether it is legitimate to include this ratio in anything
besides a linear regression model.
Table II reports the results of the separation equations12 (t-statistics are in parentheses). The
first reported regression omits the Inverse Mills Ratio, while the second includes it. Consider first
the determinants of dismissals. The most important finding is that unemployment in the local
labor market has a negative and significant (at the 1% level) effect on dismissals. This result
suggests that workers shirk less when it is most difficult to find another job in their geographic
area. On the other hand, the coefficients on the industry unemployment rate are insignificant and
are much lower than the coefficients on the local unemployment rate. The coefficients indicate
that the probability of a dismissal falls by 1.2-1.5% in response to a one percentage point rise in
the local unemployment rate and by 0.10-0.13% in response to a one percentage point rise in the
industry unemployment rate.13 (The average probability of dismissal is 3.7%.) It thus appears that
workers are more deterred from shirking by high unemployment in their geographic region than
by high unemployment in their industry. Possible explanations for this finding are that workers
are more mobile across industries than across regions or that they have greater knowledge of the
unemployment rate in their region than in their industry.
In the first regression firm size has a negative effect on dismissals, and the coefficients indicate
that a lO% rise in the size of the firm would reduce the probability of a dismissal by 0.34%.
These results may indicate that monitoring is more difficult at a large firm. However, when the
Inverse Mills Ratio is included, the coefficient on firm size becomes positive and insignificant,
so it is possible that sample selection bias may be responsible for the negative coefficient in
the equation omitting this variable. The capital-labor ratio has a positive effect on dismissals,
suggesting that firms with more capital per worker may monitor their workers more carefully,
but this effect is insignificant. The coefficient on the percentage unionized is insignificant, and it
indicates that a lO% increase in a firm's unionization rate would reduce the probability of dismissal
by 0.12-0.27%. Thus unions do not appear to make dismissing workers much more difficult.
All the variables capturing differences between states in VI regulations have the expected sign,
although the coefficient on the wage-replacement ratio is always insignificant. 14
The personal characteristics with the strongest effects on dismissals are education and sex.
The coefficient on education is negative and significant at the 1% level, possibly because better
educated workers are more productive and are better at evading detection when they shirk. In
addition, they generally perform more enjoyable jobs, so their disutility of effort may be lower.
Each year of education reduces the probability of dismissal by 0.54-0.61 %. The coefficient on sex
is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that men are more likely to be dismissed than
are women, perhaps because women face greater difficulty in finding another job if dismissed.
The probability of dismissal is 2.7-2.8% higher for men than for women.
The coefficients on %BLACK indicate that a lO% rise in the black population of the local
12. Note that al1 three equations include the same variables. It is likely that almost all the independent variables
will have an effect on dismissals, quits, and layoffs. The exceptions are that the VI variables may not directly affect quits,
and the dummy variable for rural areas may not directly affect layoffs. However, in these cases there may be an indirect
effect, since these variables will affect other types of separations, which will affect the probability of a quit or layoff
occurring within the worker's first six months of employment.
13. If we let Pj represent the probability of a type j separation, x represent one of the explanatory variables, and
(3j represent the coefficient on x for a type j separation, then dPj/dx = Pj ((3j -13), where 13 = L, PJ {3j.
14. While we would expect more workers to shirk in states with generous VI benefits, this effect may be counteracted by the fact that employers might be reluctant to discharge workers in these states out of fear of higher VI taxes. It
is also possible that workers have imperfect information about their state's VI benefits.
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
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Table II. Separation Equations

(2)

(1)
Dismissals
LOCUR
INDUR
FlRMSIZE
K/L
% UNION

-0.356
( -3.39)a
-0.0383
( -0.80)

Quits

Layoffs

-0.0524
( -1.03)

0.0585
(0.61 )

-0.0116
( -0.42)

-0.0356
( -0.68)

Dismissals
-0.420
(- 3.57)a
-0.0329
( -0.69)

Quits

Layoffs

-0.0644
(-1.23)

0.0499
(0.50)

-0.0138
( -0.50)

-0.0381
( -0.73)

-0.126
( -l.72)C

-0.160
(-3.81)a

-0.265
( -3.35)a

0.218
(0.97)

-0.147
( -1.89)C

-0.261
( -2.07)b

7.77
(1.11)

-2.14
( -0.45)

-3.09
( -0.33)

5.16
(0.72)

-2.27
( -0.47)

-3.25
( -0.35)

-0.595
( -2.20)b

0.422
(1.23)

-0.835
( -1.62)

-0.615
(-2.16)b

0.411
(1.11)

-2.08
( -0.57)

2.07
( 1.19)

-2.01
( -0.58)

-0.399
(-0.91 )

WRR

2.49
(0.84)

1.61
(0.98)

-2.67
( -0.80)

WA

2.898
(4.03)a

0.383
(1.15)

0.0820
(0.14)

3.154
(4.22)a

0.458
(1.36)

0.169
(0.28)

ENCFDFM

1.131
(2.42)b

0.0653
(0.33)

-0.346
( -0.89)

0.702
( 1.35)

0.0942
(0.44)

-0.315
( -0.77)

-0.00986
( -0.07)

0.278
(0.94)

-0.360
( -1.27)

-0.0412
( -0.28)

0.303
(1.01 )

-2.52
(-1.48)

-0.516
( -0.39)

RURAL

-0.156
( -0.59)

AGE/lOa

-0.337
(-0.26)

-2.27
( -2.68)a

-2.34
( -2.76)a

0.793
(3.04)a

-0.0268
( -0.19)

0.328
( 1.16)

EDUC

-0.155
( -2.80)a

-0.0240
( -0.73)

-0.0388
( -0.59)

-0.176
( -3.07)a

-0.0308
( -0.94)

-0.0493
( -0.76)

EXPER/IOO

-0.343
(-1.49)

-0.172
( -1.23)

-0.0449
(-0.18)

-0.332
( -1.43)

-0.l66
(-l.l8)

-0.0392
( -0.16)

SEX

%BLACK

1.439
( 1.39)

1.176
(2.05)b

-0.530
( -0.39)

A

-0.0322
0.780
(2.98)a
( -0.23)

-2.59
( -1.52)

2.062
( 1.83)C
2.81
( 1.59)

Log Likelihood
# observations

-1895.4
2994

1.084
(1.83)C
0.0825
(0.10)

0.318
(1.13)

-0.504
( -0.36)
0.0825
(0.10)

-1893.6
2994

a. significant at the 1% level
b. at the 5% level
c. at the 10% level

labor market raises the probability of a dismissal by 0.46-0.69%. In addition, when RURAL is
omitted. %BLACK is significant at the 7% level in both regressions, and the coefficients indicate
that a 10% rise in this variable raises the probability of dismissal by 0.56-0.82%. (%BLACK
and RURAL are highly correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 0.625.) When
%BLACK is omitted, RURAL is significant at the 10% level in the second regression, and the
coefficients indicate that dismissals are 1.1-1.8% more likely in urban areas than in rural areas. It
thus appears that dismissals are more common in areas with a high proportion of blacks in the
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.
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population and in urban areas. However, because these variables are so highly correlated, it is
difficult to determine which has the more important effect on dismissals. IS
Consider now the determinants of quits. The coefficients on the local unemployment rate
and industry unemployment rate are always negative but insignificant. Firm size has a negative
effect on quits, and its coefficients indicate that a 10% rise in firm size reduces the probability of
a quit by 0.16%. (The average probability of a quit is 12.8%.) These results suggest that larger
firms discourage quits through actions such as paying good wages and providing good working
conditions. The effect of the unionization rate is negative and significant at the 5% level, possibly
because unions raise wages and provide a forum for handling workers' grievances. A 10% rise
in a firm's unionization rate reduces the probability of a quit by 0.66%. The only significant
demographic variables are AGE and %BLACK. Each 10 years of age reduces the probability of
a quit by 2.5-2.6%, and a 10% rise in the black proportion of the local labor market raises the
probability of a quit by 1.1-1.3%.16
In terms of the determinants of layoffs, the only variable with a significant effect is firm size,
whose coefficients indicate that the probability of a layoff falls by 0.078-0.082% when firm size
rises by 10%. (The average probability of a layoff is 3.4%.) This result seems plausible since we
would expect hiring and training costs to be the greatest at larger firms, giving them an incentive
to hoard labor during economic downturns. I?

III. Conclusion
The most important result of this study is the finding that the local unemployment rate has a
negative and significant effect on the probability that a worker is dismissed, as predicted by the
shirking model in the efficiency wage literature. In addition, an advantage of using data on individual workers is that we can also examine the effects of firm and worker characteristics on dismissals, quits, and layoffs. Some important findings are that men are significantly more likely to
be dismissed than are women, that better educated workers are less likely to be dismissed, that
dismissals and quits both depend positively on the proportion of blacks in the local labor market,
and that older workers and workers in more heavily unionized firms are less likely to quit. It is
also interesting to note that a firm's unionization rate has an insignificant effect on the probability
of dismissal, in spite of the fact that it is often assumed that unions make dismissing workers
more difficult.
15. The occupational dummy variable with the strongest effect on dismissals is the one for unskilled workers, which
is negative and significant at the 5% level. A possible reason why unskilled workers are less likely to be dismissed is that
shirking by these workers is less costly, giving firms less incentive to monitor them closely. The probability of dismissal is
5.7-6.0% lower for unskilled workers than for service workers, who are the most likely to be dismissed. Surprisingly, all
the industry dummies are insignificant except for the variable for wholesale and retail trade, and its coefficient is significant
at only the 10% level. The probability of dismissal is 1.8% lower in wholesale and retail trade than in manufacturing, the
industry in which dismissals are the most common.
16. Almost all of the occupational dummy variables are negative and significant, indicating that service workers
are the most likely to quit. The probability of a quit is 8.6% higher for service workers than for managerial workers, the
workers least likely to quit. On the other hand, all of the industry dummy variables are insignificant, suggesting that there
is little difference between industries in quit propensities once we control for other factors.
17. Of the occupation groups, layoffs are most common among unskilled workers, where the probability of a layoff
is 4.9-5.7% higher than for managerial workers, the group for which layoffs are least common. In addition, the coefficients
on the industry dummy variables indicate that layoffs are most prevalent in manufacturing and construction, probably
because demand is most cyclical in these industries. Workers in manufacturing are 6.4% more likely to be laid off than
are workers in mining, the industry in which layoffs are least prevalent.
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